













the	 signs	 of	 ‘penal	 populism’	 and	 ‘risk	 crazed	 governance’,	 then	 social	 democratic	
criminologists	 face	 the	 dual	 challenge	 of	 explaining	 why	 these	 policies	 are	 not	 only	 not	
working	but	also	how	this	fact	continues	to	be	explained	away.	At	stake	here	are	two	central	
questions:	 firstly,	 what	 grounds	 are	 available	 to	 secure	 the	 intellectual	 legitimacy	 of	
criminology;	 and,	 secondly,	what	ways	 of	 knowing	 could	 secure	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 social‐
democratic	criminology.	The	paper	begins	by	exploring	what	is	at	stake	when	what	appears	
to	 be	 a	 very	 large	 number	 of	 criminologists	 claim	 that	 theirs	 is	 an	 ‘empirical	 scientific’	
discipline.	 The	 paper	 argues	 that	 neither	 mainstream	 criminology	 nor	 social	 democratic	





gap	 between	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 conventional	 criminology	 and	 its	 claims	 to	 ‘scientific	
empiricism’:	what	is	actually	on	offer	is	an	‘imperfect	empiricism’.The	long‐forgotten	work	of	
Bentham,	adumbrated	by	Vaihinger	(1935)	and	Fuller	(1967),	is	then	traced	and	some	of	the	
implications	of	 this	 theory	of	 fictions	 for	contemporary	representations	of	crime	are	noted.	

















Neo‐liberalism	 is	 a	 notoriously	 fuzzy	 category	 rendering	 it	 open	 variously	 to	misuse	 (Clarke	
2008)	or	 to	encouraging	unwarranted	pessimism	(Ferguson	2009).	Undeterred,	Fourcade	and	
Healey	 (2007:	 287)	 suggest	 that,	 provided	 we	 understand	 neo‐liberalism	 as	 a	 policy	 project	
which	praises	‘the	moral	benefits	of	market	society’	and	treats	‘markets	as	a	necessary	condition	
for	freedom	in	other	aspects	of	 life’,	then	it	has	some	use	value.	There	is	now	some	consensus	
that	 a	wide	 range	of	 contemporary	public	policies	 sponsored	by	neo‐liberal	 governments	 are	
not	working.	Writers	 like	 Clarke	 (2004),	 Beer	 et	 al.	 (2006),	 Engel	 (2007),	 Carlen	 (2010)	 and	
Connell	(2013)	have	shown	how	this	project	produces	increasingly	dysfunctional	effects	in	most	
policy	domains.	It	 is	generally	agreed,	even	by	the	OECD	(2011),	that	the	imbrications	of	state	





one	 thing,	 as	 social	 inequality	has	 increased,	 governments	wedded	 to	a	neo‐liberal	 imaginary	
have	 talked	 about	 attacking	 ‘social	 exclusion’	 and	 ‘social	 justice’	 while	 simultaneously	
implementing	fiscal	and	social	policies	which	exacerbate	social	inequality	and	increasing	crime	
rates;	and	pursuing	tough	‘law	’n	order’	policy	agendas	which	generate	increased	imprisonment	
rates	 (ABS	 2012).	 In	 consequence,	 as	 Hogeveen	 and	Woolford	 (2012)	 point	 out,	mainstream	
criminologists	are	now	implicated	in	the	expanding	domain	of	neo‐liberalism,	something	which	
prescient	 critics	 like	 (Wacquant	 1996)	 and	 Young	 (1999)	 had	 argued	 back	 in	 the	 1990s,	
threatened	 even	 then	 to	 push	 conventional	 criminology	 into	 respectively	 ‘self‐inflicted	
irrelevance’	or	‘administrative	complicity’.		
	
Critical	 criminologists	 (Martel	 et	 al.	 2006)	 and	 criminologists	 who	 have	 explicitly	 identified	
their	commitment	to	a	social	democratic	project	 (Reiner	2006),	confront	a	comparable	mix	of	
risk	 and	 opportunity.	 For	 if,	 as	 Carlen	 (2010)	 has	 noted,	 contemporary	 ‘justice’	 policies	 are	
exhibiting	all	the	signs	of	‘penal	populism’	(Pratt	and	Clarke	2005;	Roberts	et	al.	2003)	and	‘risk	
crazed	governance’	 (Carlen	2010),	 social	 democratic	 criminologists	 face	 the	dual	 challenge	of	










firstly,	what	grounds	are	available	 to	secure	 the	 intellectual	 legitimacy	which	criminology	can	






theoretical	 entity	 or	 a	 naturally‐occurring	 phenomenon	 but	 instead	 a	 state‐deﬁned	 social	
problem’	and	Reiner’s	(2006)	account	of	what	he	says	defines	a	‘social	democratic	tradition’	in	
criminology	 raise,	 in	 sharp	 fashion,	 some	 basic	 questions	 about	 the	 authorising	 grounds	
available	 to	 criminology	 in	 general	 or	 to	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 in	 particular.	 Among	
these	authorising	grounds,	the	basis	of	criminology’s	claim	that	either	mainstream	criminology	





‘empirical’	methods	 is	 highly	problematic	 for	 a	number	of	 reasons.	 I	 draw	on	Spencer	 (1987:	
331)	 to	 advance	 the	 unpalatable	 thesis	 that,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 actual	 practice	 by	 conventional	
criminologists	of	their	kind	of	social	science	goes,	‘they	do	not	know	what	they	are	doing’,	and	
that	their	ignorance	of	this	fact	has	serious	consequences	for	the	progress	of	their	field.	My	task	
in	 this	 respect	 is	 quite	 modest.	 I	 want	 only	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 actual	





does	 the	way	Foucauldian	 and	 ‘poststructuralist’	 critics	 have	 often	 targeted	 the	 ‘scientism’	 of	
modernist	 criminology.	 Again,	 though	 I	 cannot	make	 this	 case	 here,	 these	 critiques	 have	 not	






Secondly,	 to	 address	 some	 of	 these	 issues	 and	 to	 be	 helpful,	 I	 want	 to	 rehabilitate	 a	 long‐





consciousness	 of	 [their]	 falsity,	 or	 …	 recognised	 as	 having	 utility’	 (Fuller	 1967).	 The	 point	 is	
simple:	 if	 fictions	play	a	central	yet	 little	understood	role	 in	 the	 field	of	 ‘modern	criminology’,	
then	‘theory	of	fictions’	has	potentially	much	to	offer	to	a	social	democratic	criminology.		
	
The	 paper	 traces	 out	 briefly	 the	 long‐forgotten	 work	 of	 Bentham,	 adumbrated	 by	 Vaihinger	
(1935)	and	Fuller	 (1967),	and	points	 to	some	of	 the	 implications	of	 this	 theory	of	 fictions	 for	
contemporary	representations	of	crime.	One	implication,	again	quickly	charted	here,	is	that	any	
social	democratic	 criminology	needs	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	proper	role	played	by	 fictions	as	 they	
grapple	 with	 the	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 that	 currently	 populate	 this	 field.	 The	 long‐standing	
affectation	of	‘scientific	empiricism’	by	many	practicing	criminologists	has	long	camouflaged	the	
inability	of	conventional	criminologists	to	address	what	are	properly	‘wicked	problems’	(Rittel	
and	 Webber	 1973).	 As	 Bentham	 and	 Vaihinger	 understood,	 fictions	 wisely	 used	 add	






has	been	a	good	deal	of	 soul	 searching	by	 criminologists	 about	 the	 status	of	 criminology	 (for	




On	 the	one	hand,	 some,	 like	Garland	 (1992,	 2009),	 insist	 that	 criminology	 is	 a	pluralist,	 even	
radically	 eclectic	 enterprise.	 As	 Garland	 (2009)	 notes,	 criminology	 investigates	 a	 very	 large	
array	 of	 problems	 and	 uses	 a	 range	 of	 research	 methods	 and	 data	 sets	 of	 every	 description	








	…	 competing	 visions	 of	 what	 criminology	 ought	 to	 be	 –	 criminology	 as	
experimental	 science;	 criminology	 as	 social	 science;	 criminology	 as	 policy	




criminology	 research‐based	 knowledge	 continues	 to	 haunt	 criminology	 because	 it	 remains	 a	
‘pluralist’	 enterprise	 and	 generates	 ‘exasperation	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 sheer	 diversity	 of	









exclusive	 preference,	 for	 ‘objective’,	 ‘quantitative	 research’.	 Typical	 early	 studies,	 like	Holmes	
and	 Taggart’s	 (1990)	 review	 of	 three	 major	 criminology	 journals	 (1976‐1988),	 pointed	 to	 a	
preponderance	of	what	they	call	‘inductive	and	quantitative	empiricist	methods’	accounting	for	
between	 63	 per	 cent	 to	 76	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 articles	 published.	 DiChristina	 (1997)	 concurred,	




‘causal	 explanations’	 and	 relied	 on	 ‘correlational	 research	 designs,	 cross‐sectional	 data	 and	
multivariate	 statistics	 [sic]’	 because	 of	 the	 ‘predictive’	 value	 and	 influence	 of	 quantitative	
research	 on	 criminal	 justice	 research.	 (The	 drift	 from	 observation	 to	 advocacy	 seems	 to	
encourage	obscuring	the	difference	between	‘causal’	and	‘correlational’	claims).	Worrall	(2000)	
also	pointed	 to	a	 steady	 increase	 in	 this	preference	over	 the	 study	period.	 In	 the	 twenty‐first	
century,	Kleck	at	al.	(2006)	paint	a	similar	picture	from	their	survey	of	every	article	in	the	seven	
most	highly	ranked	criminology	journals	(2001‐02).	Survey	research	was	the	dominant	method,	
cross‐sectional	 non‐experimental	 designs	 predominated,	 and	multivariate	 statistical	 methods	
were	 the	 norm,	 accounting	 ‘for	 88.9	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 articles’	 (Buckler	 2008:	 149).	 Buckler	
confirmed,	 in	 his	 study	 of	 leading	 criminology	 journals	 between	 2003‐07,	 that	 quantitative	
research	accounted	for	approximately	90	per	cent	of	the	articles.	Research	by	Tewkesbury	et	al.	
(2005)	and	Tewkesbury	et	al.	 (2010)	confirmed	that	quantitative	research	continued	to	make	




used	quantitative	methods.	More	 recently,	Nolasco	 et	 al.	 (2010:	 5)	 agreed	 that	 criminological	
research	 ‘focuses	 on	 numerical	 objectivity	 and	 quantification	 …	 which	 ensures	 less	
arbitrariness’.	My	 own	 survey	 of	 criminology	 in	 Australia	 (using	Australian	and	New	Zealand	
Journal	of	Criminology	between	2008	and	2011)	suggests	Australian	criminology	is	slightly,	but	




If	 we	 pay	 closer	 attention	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 discussion	 about	 the	 state	 of	 criminology,	 we	 see	
several	 problematic	 propositions.	 One	 of	 those	 things	 is	 the	 unexamined	 conflation	 of	 ‘the	











Unlike	 other	 sciences	 and	 well‐constituted	 academic	 disciplines,	 criminology’s	







the	 disciplinary	 power	 that	 shaped	 it'.	 As	 Luna	 (2010:	 249)	 notes,	 disciplines	 are	 generally	
understood	to	require	an	explicit	conceptual	object	on	which	to	focus	their	enquiries.	As	Fattah	
(1997:	 37)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 while	 mainstream	 criminologists	 have	 insisted	 that	 ‘crime’	 is	 a	
natural	 and/or	 social	 reality,	 the	 quest	 to	 demonstrate	 this	 proposition	 has	 so	 far	 been	
unsuccessful.	 Alternative	 criminologists	 have	 not	 done	 any	 better	 in	 terms	 of	 providing	 a	




‘scientiﬁc’	 one,	 ‘independent	 from	 politicians	 and	 legislators’.	 (It	 is	 generally	 agreed	 that	 he	
failed	 to	 make	 this	 case.)	 In	 this	 respect,	 we	 can	 therefore	 say,	 secondly,	 that	 Cohen	 tacitly	
agreed	 with	 Garland	 that	 indeed	 ‘crime’	 is	 whatever	 a	 ‘state’	 defines	 it	 to	 be’.	 Granted	 this,	
Garland’s	 proposition	 has	 a	 lot	 to	 commend	 it:	 as	 (Bottoms	 2000)	 insists,	 the	 criminological	
research	object	–	‘crime’	and	its	control	–	is	a	political	and	moral	construct.		
	
However	 Garland	 muddies	 the	 water	 somewhat	 when	 he	 adds	 that:	 ‘Criminology’s	 basic	
organising	principle	is	the	empirical	study	of	crime	and	its	control	–	which	is	to	say,	the	study	of	
a	 legally‐defined	 entity	 [emphasis	 added]	 and	 a	 state‐directed	 practice’	 (Garland	 2009:	 118).	
Seemingly	undaunted	by	the	precariousness	of	this	cascade	of	claims,	the	central	confusion	I	am	






our	account	of	 the	 ‘empirical’	means,	 this	 is	horribly	 confused.	 If	 ‘empiricism’	has	ever	meant	
anything,	 it	 means	 knowledge	 claims	 based	 on	 theory‐free	 observations	 and	 experiences	 of	
realia	(that	is,	‘things’	amenable	to	sensory	examination)	and	not	whatever	is	mandated	either	
by	 ‘theoretical	 assumptions’,	 ‘ethical	 ideas’	 or	 by	political	 agencies.	 As	 Hacking	 (1983:	 41‐2)	
puts	 it,	 empiricists	 have	 long	 held	 that	 judgments	 about	 truth	 or	 falsity	 can	 be	 settled	 by	
empirical	enquiry	‘where	the	deliverances	of	sight,	hearing	and	touch	provide	the	best	basis	for	
scientiﬁc	 inference’.	 There	 can	be	 little	doubt,	 as	numerous	 criminologists	have	 testified,	 that	
‘crime’	is	indeed	‘a	state‐deﬁned	social	problem’,	and	that	when	Garland	refers	to	criminology	as	
something	 to	 be	 understood	 at	 an	 ‘epistemological	 level’,	 he	 really	 means	 to	 say	 that	 any	
epistemological	 issues	 have	 been	 dissolved	 by	 a	 political	 decision:	 crime	 is	 less	 an	
‘epistemological’	 entity	 and	 more	 a	 ‘political’	 artefact.	 As	 someone	 influenced	 by	 Foucault,	
Garland	 presumably	 intends	 us	 to	 understand	 that	 truth,	 for	 example,	 is	 simply	 an	 effect	 of	
power.	Yet	taken	seriously,	this	would	have	the	effect	of	rendering	any	kind	of	criminology	into	
a	 parasitic	 pseudo‐intellectual	 enterprise	 whose	 credibility	 is	 simply	 adjudicated	 by	 or	








What	of	 the	 social	democratic	 tradition?	As	Reiner	 (2006)	notes,	while	 the	 ‘social	democratic	
criminology’	label	has	been	used	by	writers	like	Taylor	(1982)	and	Downes	(1983,	1988),	‘it	has	
never	been	a	self‐espoused	label’	(Reiner	2006:	7).	He	sets	about	trying	to	clarify	what	the	social	
democratic	 tradition	 entails.	 In	 terms	 which	 imply	 the	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 ontological,	
epistemological	 and	 practical	 dimensions	 of	 criminology,	 Reiner	 (2006:	 8)	 proposes	 that	 the	







both	 by	 social	 democracy	 per	 se,	 and	 by	 the	 ‘social	 democratic	 tradition’	 in	 criminology,	
especially	when	he	identifies	exemplars	who	he	says	represent	social	democratic	criminology.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	 claims	 that,	 while	 it	 suffers	 from	 a	 certain	 taxonomic	 fuzziness,	 ‘social	
democracy’	 refers	 to	 a	 ‘Marxist	 tradition	 of	 parliamentary	 socialism	 which	 is	 positioned	
between	liberalism	and	communism’	(Reiner	2006:	9).	However,	on	the	other	hand,	Reiner	also	
wants	to	include	‘mixed	economy	welfare	states	in	the	UK	and	the	Rooseveltian	New	Deal	in	the	
United	States’	 (Reiner	2006:	9)	 in	the	social	democratic	 tradition.	He	only	muddies	the	water,	
however,	when	he	adds	 that,	 in	 the	1990s,	 ‘Blair	 and	Giddens,	 explicitly	 sought	 to	 triangulate	
this	“social	democracy”	and	neo‐liberalism’	(Reiner	2006:	8).	This	portrait	of	social	democracy	
seems	 less	 than	 likely	 to	 win	 support	 from	 political	 theorists	 who	 might	 wish	 to	 insist	 on	








paradigm’	 (2006:	 37)	 in	 criminology,	 supplying	 the	 ‘quintessential	 elements	 of	 “penal	
modernism”’	 (2006:	21).	Further	this	 ‘dominant	paradigm’	consisted	 in	 ‘…	a	deep	structure	of	
shared	 assumptions	 that	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 social	 democratic’	 (2006:	 9).	 To	 that	 bold	
claim	he	 adds	 that:	 ‘The	quintessential	 expression	 of	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 is	Robert	
Merton’s	 seminal	 formulation	 of	 anomie	 theory’,	 adding	 that	 ‘In	 Britain	 its	 clearest	 exponent	
was	Hermann	Mannheim’	(Reiner	2006:	9).		
	
The	 first	 thing	 to	 be	 said	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 or	 analysis	 offered	 to	 support	 the	
proposition	 that	 the	 social	 democratic	 ‘tradition’	 constituted	 ‘the	 dominant	 paradigm’	 in	
criminology.	Accordingly,	there	is	no	discussion	of	whether	the	leading	British	criminologists	of	




arguably	 important	 differences	 between	 those	 criminologists	 who	 identified	 explicitly	 with	
different	 traditions	 like	 ‘social	 democracy’,	 ‘laborism’,	 ‘progressivism’,	 ‘social’	 (or	 ‘Keynesian)	





















This	 presumably	 is	 why	 he	 insists	 that	 ‘They	 regarded	 it	 as	 useful	 to	 formulate	 and	 test	
empirical	generalizations’	(Reiner	2006:	11).	However	he	goes	on	to	add	that:		
	
Social	 democratic	 criminologists	 were	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 difficulties	 in	











to	have	acknowledged,	 is	 less	 to	do	with	 ‘interpreting’	 and	more	 to	do	with	being	able	 to	 say	
anything	 ‘empirical’	about	 the	amount	of	 criminal	activity	because,	as	Garland	(2009:	18)	has	
said,	 crime	 is	 not	 ‘a	 self‐generated	 theoretical	 entity	 or	 a	 naturally‐occurring	 phenomenon’.	
Reiner	tacitly	concedes	Garland’s	point	when	he	says:	
	









broadly	 positivist,	 because	 most	 ‘…	 accepted	 Weber’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 problems,	 limitations,	
ultimate	 impossibility	 and	 yet	 importance	 and	 desirability	 as	 an	 ideal	 of	 value‐freedom	 in	
science’.4	 Yet,	 even	 as	Reiner	 insists	 that	 criminology	was	 ‘broadly	positivist’,	 it	 seems	 it	 also	
aimed	 at,	 and	 ‘was	 derived	 from	 explicitly	 espoused	 ethical	 values’	 such	 as	 ‘the	 fundamental	
equality	of	value	of	individuals,	[or]	the	ancient	Golden	Rule	embodied	in	the	Biblical	injunction	
to	love	your	neighbour	as	yourself’	(2006:	12).	Given	there	is	general	agreement	(for	example,	
Goldthorpe	2007;	Oberschall	1987)	 that	 the	varieties	of	 ‘positivist’	Anglophone	 social	 science	
have	 rested	 their	 claims	 to	 intellectual	 authority	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 ‘real’	 science	 accesses	
empirical	experience	proceeds	by	keeping	‘values’	out	of	their	research,	this	proposition	may	be	
surprising	to	some.	Equally,	Reiner	seems	to	have	no	anxiety	about	claiming,	on	the	one	hand,	























through	 further	 observation	 and	 experimentation	…	 Science	 is	 then	 firmly	 and	




The	 modern	 subversion	 of	 this	 ‘scientism’	 began	 when	 Kuhn	 (1962)	 argued	 that	 practising	










the	 ‘espoused	 theory’	 and	 ‘imperfect	 empiricism’	 (or	 the	 ‘theory	 in	 use’)	 is	 even	 more	
powerfully	evident	in	social	sciences	like	criminology.		
	




verify	 research	 results,	 this	 will	 yield	 inconclusive	 results	 because	 different	 researchers	 will	
interpret	these	results	differently.	As	for	the	‘empirical	evidence’,	the	canons	of	evidence	of	the	
relevant	 community	 of	 scholars	 define	 what	 is	 ‘social	 reality’,	 which	 requires	 that	 any	 raw	
observations	 or	 even	 experience	 cannot	 be	 treated	 as	 evidence	 until	 converted	 or	 translated	
into	the	conventionally‐defined	forms	that	quantitative	evidence	must	take.	Likewise	when	new	
‘theoretical’	frames	or	‘empirical	data’	is	presented,	practising	criminologists	will	tend	to	reject	
these	 new	 insights,	 especially	 if	 they	 contradict	 already	 settled	 convictions.	 Each	 of	 these	
circumstances	will,	 in	 turn,	be	 ignored	as	 criminologists	 continue	 to	 claim	 that	 ‘their’	work	 is	




One	 of	 the	 basic	 difficulties	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 way	 ‘evidence’	 has	 been	 understood	 by	








illuminated	 by	 etymological	 considerations	 which	 point	 to	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 idea	 of	
‘evidence’	 as	what	 becomes	 available	 to	 us	 courtesy	 of	 our	 sensory	 experience,	 and	what	we	
make	up	as	‘facts’	when	we	claim	to	know	things.	Our	oldest	conception	of	‘evidence’	(from	the	
Latin	vidi	=	to	see)	relies	on	the	sense	of	sight:	‘evidence’	is	what	we	can	see.	It	points	to	a	long	
tradition	of	 treating	what	 is	 available	 to	us,	 courtesy	of	 senses	 like	 sight,	 as	 the	 authoritative	
basis	for	grasping	the	truth.	Conversely,	the	idea	of	‘facts’	comes	to	us	from	the	Latin	(facere	=	to	
make).	This	gives	us	categories	like	the	factor	(or	worker)	who	labours	in	a	factory	and	the	idea	
of	 ‘fabrication’.	 Facts	 are	what	 we	 construct.	Worse,	 as	 any	 number	 of	modern	 philosophers	
from	Quine	(1974)	to	Putnam	(2002)	have	demonstrated,	the	tendency	to	treat	‘evidence’	as	a	
synonym	 for	 observable	 ‘facts’	 opens	 up	 deep	 problems.	 The	 positivist‐empiricist	 tradition	
attempt	 to	make	 ‘publicly	 observable’	 ‘physical	 objects’	 and	 ‘events’	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 defensible	
conception	of	 evidence,	 for	 example,	has	proved	 too	difficult	 to	 specify,	 let	 alone	defend.	And	
there’s	the	rub.	Because	the	lie	at	work	becomes	clear	if	we	consider	this:	if	criminologists	are	
indeed	working	as	‘scientific	empiricists’	claim	to	do,	this	would	require	them	to	specify,	among	
other	 things,	 the	 rational	 grounds	 of	 belief	 they	 have,	 along	 with	 the	 evidence	 they	 have	
‘discovered’	 which	 ostensibly	 support	 their	 knowledge	 claims.	 If	 indeed	 all,	 or	 even	 most,	
criminologists	are	also	working	as	‘scientific	empiricists’,	then	there	must	be	a	consensus	based	
on	 the	 rational	 principles	 of	 belief	 among	 these	members	 of	 the	 scientific	 community.	 For	 as	
Spencer	 notes	 with	memorable	 brutality,	 this	 must	 be	 so	 because	 ‘if	 these	 two	 principles	 of	
rational	 debate	 hold,	 then	disagreement	must	be	 impossible’	 (Spencer	 1987:	 367).	 That	 is,	 the	
combination	of	evidence,	the	sharing	of	the	same	rational	protocols	and	the	shared	principles	of	
interpretation,	 must	 result	 in	 a	 correct	 and	 consensual	 belief	 produced	 by	 rational	
argumentation.	This,	of	course,	is	the	embarrassing	absence	in	criminology.	
	






While	 any	 number	 of	 criminologists	 influenced	 by	 Foucault,	 Habermas,	 and	 Latour	 (like	
Garland,	Turner)	have	generated	a	range	of	constructivist,	poststructuralist,	and	post‐modernist	
critiques	of	the	‘scientism’	of	modern	criminology,	this	critical	deconstruction	has	not	proved	all	
that	 effective	 (Russell	 1997).	 Arguably	 at	 least	 one	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	 much	 of	 this	
critique	 has	 been	 treated	 as	 ‘foreign’	 or	 ‘external’	 to	 the	 intellectual	 traditions	 from	 which	
Anglo‐American	criminology	has	emerged.		
	
No	such	excuse	 is	possible	for	the	 investigation	of	 the	role	played	by	 ‘fictions’	both	 in	the	 law	
and	in	every	other	domain	of	human	thought	and	action	instaurated	by	Jeremy	Bentham.	I	argue	






a	 complex	 and	 interesting	 theory	 of	 fictions	 which	 belies	 his	 by‐now	 mythic	 status	 as	 the	
founder	of	‘legal	positivism’	and	an	excoriating	critic	of	‘legal	fictions’.	I	then	adumbrate	some	of	
the	 implications	 of	 this	 theory	 of	 fictions	 (Fuller	 1967;	 Vaihinger	 1935)	 for	 criminology.	 The	
point	 is	 simple:	 the	development	of	 a	 sophisticated	 theory	 of	 fictions	 initiated	by	Bentham	 is	
simply	 too	 important	 to	 be	 left	 to	 a	 few	 legal	 studies	 scholars.	 Contemporary	 research	 in	








British	 criminologist	 Pat	 Carlen	 (2010:	 122)	 argues,	 the	 vast	 array	 of	 legal	 and	other	 fictions	
raises	large	and	difficult	questions	about	the	‘knowledge’	and	principles	which	those	academics,	
officials,	 policy‐makers,	 judges	 and	police	who	make	up	 a	 ‘criminal	 justice	 system’,	 are	 either	
busily	fabricating	or	relying	on.	This	may	seem	odd	for	those	who	believe,	naively	perhaps,	that	
‘the	law’	or	modern	criminal	justice	systems	have	a	robust	and	uncomplicated	regard	for	getting	
at	 ‘the	 facts’.	 Just	 how	 complicated	 and	 complicating	 is	 suggested	 initially	 when	 we	 briefly	
consider	 Jeremy	 Bentham’s	 well‐known	 opposition	 to	 ‘legal	 fictions’,	 and	 his	 much	 more	
interesting	account	of	the	role	of	fictions	in	social	life.		
	
Anglo‐American	 legal	 systems	 are	 conventionally	 understood	 to	 be	 preoccupied	 with	
establishing	the	facts	and	assigning	responsibility	for	wrongs	and	remedies	on	the	basis	of	those	
facts.	 Yet	 as	many	modern	 philosophers	 of	 the	 law	 like	 de	 Champs	 (1999),	 Polloczek	 (1999)	
Stolzenberg	(1999),	Schofield	(2006:	1‐27),	Quinn	(2011),	Schauer	(2011)	and	Knauer	(2010)	
have	noticed,	Anglophone	 legal	 systems	are	 actually	 filled	with	 legal	 fictions.	While	 these	 are	
difficult	to	define	in	their	generality,	a	narrow	‘procedural’	definition	of	a	legal	fiction	involves	‘a	
false	 allegation	 of	 fact	 employed	 to	 enlarge	 jurisdiction	 or	 to	 extend	 substantive	 remedies’	
usually	to	avoid	changing	an	existing	body	of	law	or	rules	(Harmon	1991:	2).	Among	the	many	
modern	 examples	 are	 the	 way	 tax	 law	 treats	 companies	 as	 if	 they	 are	 individuals,	 or	 the	
‘attractive	nuisance’	doctrine	in	US	tort	law	(for	the	latter,	see	Ohio	Supreme	Court	2001).		
	
Bentham	 (1943	 i:	 59)	 is	 conventionally	 understood	 to	 have	 treated	 these	 legal	 fictions	 as	 a	
symptom	of	everyth++++++ing	wrong	about	English	law.	Bentham	understood	by	the	idea	of	a	
legal	fiction	‘	…	a	false	assertion	of	a	privileged	kind	…	which	though	acknowledged	to	be	false,	is	
at	 the	 same	 time	 argued	 from	 and	 acted	 upon	 as	 if	 true’	 (Bentham	1843	 ix:	 77).	 Bentham	 is	
conventionally	represented	as	the	greatest	scourge	of	English	common	law	and	its	reliance	on	
the	‘pernicious	fictions’	generated	by	jurists	like	Blackstone.	As	Stolzenberg	(1999:	226)	notes,	
Bentham’s	 contempt	 for	 legal	 fictions	 ‘bordered	 on	 an	 obsession’	 and	 lead	 him	 to	 express	
himself	 repeatedly,	 and	 splenetically,	 on	 the	 topic:	 ‘In	 English	 law,	 fiction	 is	 a	 syphilis,	which	
runs	 in	 every	 vein,	 and	 carries	 into	 every	 part	 of	 the	 system	 the	 principle	 of	 rottenness’	




However,	 as	 recent	 scholarship	 has	 demonstrated,	 Bentham’s	 actual	 position	 on	 fictions	 is	
infinitely	more	 complex	 –	 and	 challenging	 (de	 Champs	 1999;	 Fine	1993;	 Lee	1990;	 Polloczek	
1999;	Quinn	2011;	 	Schofield	2006:	1‐27;	Stolzenberg	1999).	Reflecting	the	revival	of	rhetoric	
and	the	development	of	critical	legal	studies	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	scholars	like	Fish	(1972),	
Patey	 (1984),	 Eden	 (1986),	 Brann	 (1991),	Welsh	 (1992),	 Schauer	 (2011)	 and	Knauer	 (2010)	
have	demonstrated	that	Bentham’s	actual	position	on	the	role	of	fictions	in	language	relied	on	a	
highly	 sophisticated	 engagement	 with	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 century	 linguistic	 theory	
developed	 inter	alia	by	Descartes,	 Pascal,	 Locke,	Harris,	 Priestley	 and,	 especially,	 Tooke.	 That	
engagement	 lead	Bentham	 ‘to	 see	 discourse	 as	 the	necessary	 symbolic	 foundation	 of	 another	
symbolic	system:	that	of	power	relationships	within	society’	(de	Champs	1999:	28).	Like	Ogden	
(1932),	 Stolzenberg	 (1999)	 and	 Schofield	 (2006)	 demonstrate	 that	 Bentham	 understood	 the	
role	and	value	of	fictions,	locating	them	within	a	complex	account	of	human	language	in	which	
fictions	make	possible	human	cognition,	 judgement	and	action.	 It	 is	not	possible	here	 to	 fully	











“mirrored”	 reality	 would	 be	 impossible’.	 By	 ‘real’,	 Bentham	 simply	 meant	 that	 there	 were	
physical	 things	or	 realia	 available	 to	us	via	 sensory	perceptions	on	which	we	 then	arbitrarily	
confer	 names.	 To	 use	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 modern	 philosophy,	 Bentham	 rejected	 a	
‘correspondence’	theory	of	 truth’.	Rather,	Bentham	spoke	 ‘often	and	approvingly	of	 fictions	as	





it:	 ‘Bentham	 believed	 that	 language	must	 contain	 fictions	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 a	 language’.	 As	
Quinn	(2011)	indicates,	Bentham’s	position	assumes:	
	
…	 a	 fundamental	 linguistic	 distinction	 between	 names	which	 have	 referents	 in	
the	 world,	 and	 names	 which	 have	 no	 such	 referents,	 reflecting	 an	 ontological	




be	 a	 correspondence	 between	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 external	 world	 and	 our	





it	 to	 say	 the	 novelty	 and	 reach	 of	 Bentham’s	 actual	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 fictions	was	
neither	fully	grasped	nor	recognised	until	the	1930s,	before	again	disappearing	and	then	being	
remembered	again	 in	 the	 late	1980s.	 It	 is	 certainly	puzzling	 that	while	Ogden	 (1932)	 tried	 to	
rehabilitate	 Bentham’s	 achievement,	 Fuller	 (1967),	 a	 great	 modern	 legal	 scholar,	 dealt	
definitively	with	a	theory	of	legal	fictions	in	a	way	that	paralleled	Bentham’s	theory	of	fictions	–	
whilst	 denying	 to	 Bentham	 any	 credit	 for	 doing	 so	 (Stolzenberg	 1999)!	 Finally	 and	 no	 less	
puzzling,	 the	 most	 significant	 ‘modern’	 contribution	 to	 thinking	 about	 fictions	 was	 made	 by	
Hans	Vaihinger	and	that,	as	Ogden	(1934:	v)	noted,	Vaihinger’s	developed	his	general	theory	of	
fictions	 without	 any	 awareness	 of	 Bentham’s	 theory	 of	 fictions	 which	 it	 both	 shadowed	 and	
elaborated.	
	
In	1877,	Vaihinger	began	a	project	 to	demonstrate	 the	 role	 that	 fictions,	 both	as	 concept	 (for	
example,	 ‘atom’	or	 ‘justice’)	 and	 as	propositions	 (for	 example,	 ‘all	men	are	motivated	only	by	
self‐interest’),	play	both	in	human	affairs	and	in	all	the	‘sciences’	(Vaihinger	1935).	Vaihinger’s	
work	 exemplifies	 a	 general	 turn	 by	 contemporary	 philosophers	 (for	 example,	 Peirce,	
Wittgenstein,	Richards,	Ayer,	Austin,	Popper,	Winch)	to	acknowledge	the	special	role	played	by	
language	 and	 other	 symbolic	 systems	 in	 an	 account	 of	 human	 thought	 and	 action	 which	
emphasised	 the	 human	 and/or	 social	 character	 of	 knowledge	 as	 an	 historically	 evolving	
practice.	It	effectively	rejected	the	oldest	western	tradition	inaugurated	by	Plato	committed	to	
identifying	 the	 criteria	 by	which	 ‘truth’	 could	 be	 known.	 ‘Truth’	 was	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	
eternal,	 universal,	 even	 law‐like	 propositions	 deduced	 by	 logical	 reasoning,	 deploying	
essentialist	 concepts,	 and	 searching	 for	 fundamental	 foundations	 which	 could	 establish	 a	
timeless	correspondence	between	what	we	know	and	a	reality	no	less	immutable	and	timeless	












or	 less	 irresistibility,	and	both	come	from	within	our	body	as	well	as	are	 impressed	upon	our	
body’	(Vaihinger	1935:	xlvii)	(For	the	relevant	critique	of	this	and	the	reframing	of	‘fictions’	as	a	
product	 of	 a	 ‘social	 imaginary’,	 see	 Castoriadis	 1997:	 322‐4).	 Vaihinger	 (1935:	 167)	 thought,	
while	these	‘facts’	(or	sensations	of	real	objects	and	phenomena)	were	the	proper	objects	of	any	




	…	 many	 thought‐processes	 and	 thought‐constructs	 appear	 to	 be	 consciously	
false	 assumptions,	 which	 either	 contradict	 reality	 or	 are	 even	 contradictory	 in	
themselves	 but	 which	 are	 intentionally	 thus	 formed	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	
difficulties	of	thought	by	this	artificial	deviation.	(Vaihinger	1935:	xlvi‐xlvii)		
	
These	 fictions	play	a	vital,	 even	 indispensable,	 role	 in	all	domains	of	human	 life	 including	 the	




science’	 as	well	 as	 address	 questions	 of	meaning	 (for	 example,	 by	way	 of	myth,	 religion	 and	
aesthetic	 activity)	 or	 help	 us	 order	 our	 social	 life	 (for	 example,	 ethical	 and	 politico‐legal	
practice).	 They	 are	 justifiable	 to	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 prove	 useful	 in	 solving	 an	 array	 of	
human	problems	or	meeting	our	needs.	
	
Because	 fictions	play	a	huge	variety	of	 roles	 in	all	human	 thought	and	action,	 their	scope	and	
role	 is	 legion.	 How	 reliant	 we	 are	 on	 fictions	 is	 suggested	 in	 Vaihinger’s	 account	 of	 fictions	
which	formalises	Bentham’s	earlier	typology.	They	include:		
	
 Artificial	 classification,	 for	 example,	 biological	 classifications	 which	 are	 reliant	 on	
fictional	categories	like	‘species’	or	‘genera’.		
 Abstractive	fictions	which	explain	some	large	problem	or	phenomenon	by	leaving	out	a	
lot	 of	 messy	 detail.	 Economists,	 for	 example,	 rely	 on	 a	 ‘rational	 actor’	 model	 which	
insists	 all	 human	 action	 is	 rational	 and	 selfish	 and	 then	 use	 this	 to	 construe	 the	
behaviour	of	markets	or	even	whole	societies.		
 Type	 fictions	 include	Weberian	 ideal‐types	 like	 ‘bureaucracy’,	 ‘populism’	or	 ‘traditional	
authority’.	
 Analogical	or	metaphoric	fictions	use	analogy	to	make	sense	of	one	thing	in	terms	of	the	








 Mathematical	 fictions	 include	 fundamental	 concepts	 like	 ‘point’,	 ‘line’,	 ‘circle’,	 ‘triangle’	
‘number’	‘lines	without	breadth’,	‘empty	space’,	‘empty	time’	as	well	as	propositions	like	
‘a	line	is	a	series	of	points’.	This	treatment	of	algebra,	arithmetic	and	geometry	stresses	
that	 these	 are	 entirely	 fictional	 enterprises	 and	 have	 been	 knowingly	 constructed	 on	






whole,	 constitutes	 the	 classical	 instance	 of	 an	 ingenious	 instrument,	 or	 a	 mental	
expedient	for	facilitating	the	operation	of	thought’.	
	




…	correctness	of	a	 logical	process	 lies	 in	practice,	and	the	purpose	of	thought	is	
not	proved	by	the	adequacy	of	the	reflection	of	a	so‐called	‘objective’	world,	but	
in	 rendering	 possible	 the	 calculation	 of	 events	 and	 of	 operations	 upon	 them.	
(Vaihinger	1935:	5)		
	
The	 implication	 is	 that	we	need	to	 think	about	 the	value	of	our	knowledge	not	 in	 terms	of	 its	




systems	 they	help	 to	 constitute,	 are	 symbolic	 expressions	of	political	 and	 cultural	patterns	of	
power	or	what	Bourdieu	(2003:	43‐65)	represented	as	unequal	forms	of	symbolic	capital.	Both	
Bentham	and	Vaihinger	also	begged	the	question	of	how	we	can	ever	know	or	test	our	fictions	in	
ways	 which	 evade	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘cognitive	 dissonance’,	 the	 well‐documented	 psychological	




The	 recovery	 of	 this	 theory	 of	 fictions	 is	 pertinent,	 especially	 for	 those	 concerned	 by	 the	
continuing	 influence	 of	 conventional	 criminology	 which	 Tauri	 (2013:	 220‐2)	 aptly	 calls	
‘authoritarian	 criminology’.	 Tauri	 (2013:	 210)	 characterises	modern	 criminology	 as	 a	way	 of	
thinking	about	the	world	which	is	at	once	 ‘administrative’	and	 ‘authoritarian’,	which	claims	to	
know	our	world	by	clothing	itself	in	a	‘veil	of	scientism’	by	claiming	‘scientific	empiricist’	status	
to	assist	 in	both	 the	 ‘discovery’	of	 crime	and	 its	evaluation	of	what	works	–	or	doesn’t.	These	

















by	 fictions:	 they	help	us	when	 they	are	being	used	consciously	and	 fruitfully	 to	pursue	better	
solutions	 to	 the	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 we	 face.	 For	 if	 the	 theory	 of	 fictions	 has	 been	 too	 long	


















problems	 like	 ‘what	 engineering	 features	 will	 enable	 a	 bridge	 to	 carry	 40	 ton	 trucks’.	 Tame	
problems	 involve	 conceptual	 entities	 which	 enable	 narrow	 and	 specific	 definitions,	 either	
because	they	possess	formal	axiological	properties	(like	all	mathematical	systems	or	games)	or	
because	 they	 are	 amenable	 to	 precise	 empirical	 description.	 Tame	 problems	 have	 tame	
solutions.	This	means	there	are	solutions	which	involve	‘true’/	‘false	or	‘yes’/’no’	answers:	there	





are	 irreducibly	 practical,	 ethical	 and/or	 political	 in	 nature.	 Wicked	 problems	 are	 by	 nature	
ineffable	since	we	cannot	even	get	an	agreed‐on	definition	of	what	the	problem	is.	To	begin	at	the	
beginning,	there	is	no	definitive	formulation	of	a	wicked	problem:	defining	wicked	problems	is	




early	 nineteenth	 century,	 that	 we	 treat	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 as	 if	 they	 are	 ‘tame	 problems’	









Sara	 present	 the	 various	 professional	 police,	 lawyers,	 youth	 workers	 or	 magistrates	 with	 a	
practical	question:	What	should	we	do	with	Johnny	or	Sara?	That	question	will	be	addressed	by	
a	combination	of	soundings	based	on	the	relevant	laws,	the	state	of	the	resources	available	to	








to	wicked	 problems	 are	 not	 right	 or	wrong.	 There	 is	 no	 immediate	 and	 no	 ultimate	 test	 of	 a	
solution	to	a	wicked	problem.	Often	the	problem	is	not	understood	until	after	the	formulation	of	
a	 solution.	Every	wicked	problem	 is	 essentially	 novel	 and	unique.	Every	 solution	 to	 a	wicked	









Though	 they	seem	not	 to	have	been	conscious	of	 it,	Rittel	and	Webber	 (1973)	were,	 in	effect,	
making	 the	 same	 point	 made	 by	 Aristotle	 when	 he	 distinguished	 between	 the	 alignment	 of	
episteme	with	theoria	as	the	appropriate	kind	of	science	to	know	the	physis	of	the	natural	world	
on	 the	one	hand	and,	 on	 the	other,	 the	 role	 of	phronesis	 (or	 practical	wisdom)	as	 the	 kind	of	
knowledge	we	need	to	work	out	what	kind	of	praxis	we	ought	to	engage	in	order	to	solve	the	
practical	 or	wicked	 problems	 communities	 and	 people	 encounter.	 Both	 Sharpe	 and	 Schwartz	
(2010)	 and	 Flyvbjerg	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 have	 argued	 persuasively	 for	 a	 major	 rethink	 about	 the	
relationships	between	different	kinds	of	knowledge	and	our	practical	attempts	to	solve	wicked	
problems.	That	case	needs	to	be	taken	seriously	by	academics	and	practitioners	working	in	the	
field	 of	 ‘modern	 criminology’	 as	 I	 have	 defined	 it	 broadly	 here	 and	 by	 those	 interested	 in	
developing	a	critical	youth	studies.	That	rethink	will	begin	by	taking	the	Benthamic	account	of	
fictions	seriously,	as	a	prelude	to	re‐imagining	problems	addressed	by	criminologists	as	a	field	
beset	 by	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 urgently	 needing	 the	 application	 of	 practical	 wisdom.	 For	 social	










paper	 is	 just	 one	part,	 assumes	 that	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 criminology	whether	 in	 its	 conventional	 form	and/or	 as	 a	
social	democratic	project,	will	rely	on	the	success	with	which	its	proponents	clarify	and	defend	their	practices	and	




available.	 My	 assumption	 here	 is	 that	 a	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 will	 need	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 the	
characteristic	ways	mainstream	criminology	understands	or	addresses	these	matters.	Again	schematically	I	would	




2		Problems	 akin	 to	 Garland’s	 are	 emulated	 frequently.	 For	 example	 Cooper	 and	 Worrall	 (2012:390)	 claim	 that	




says	Young,	 is	because	a	realist	criminology	will	 ‘not	merely	 reflect	 the	world	of	appearances’	which	 is	precisely	
what	 empiricism	 is	 committed	 to	 doing.	 Other	 realists	 like	 Mathews	 (1987:	 371)	 were	 insisting	 that	 ‘realist	
criminology’	 promotes	 ‘a	 commitment	 to	 detailed	 empirical	 investigation’	 and	 stressing	 ‘the	 independence	 and	
objectivity	 of	 criminal	 activity’.	 Mathews’	 subsequent	 defence	 of	 realism	 is	 qualified	 to	 the	 point	 of	 terminal	
confusion	when	he	allows	that	crime	is	‘historically	variable’	but	is	‘real’	because	it	is	the	product	of	what	he	calls	
‘material	 relations’	 which	 allows	 him	 then	 to	 excoriate	 commentators	 like	 Hulsman	 (1986:	 71),	 when	 Hulsman	
argued	that	‘crime	has	no	ontological	reality’.	
3		Among	 many	 considerations	 Reiner	 would	 need	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 well	 known	 structural‐functionalist	












5		This	 proposition	 is	 then	 welded	 to	 another	 claim	 that	 proper	 knowledge	 or	 ‘truth’	 conforms	 to	 the	 originating	





7		Though	 this	 point	 will	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 a	 later	 paper,	 this	 points	 to	 even	more	 difficult	 issues	 for	 quantitative	
criminology	 raised	 by	 problems	 being	 revealed	 in	 bio‐medical	 research,	 long	 admired	 as	 exemplifying	 the	 ‘gold	
standard’	 for	 high	 quality	 explanatory‐cum‐predictive	 research.	 Ioannides	 (2005)	 proposition	 that	 there	 was	
‘increasing	concern	 that	most	published	[biomedical]	 research	 findings	are	 false’	has	proved	a	useful	stimulus	 in	
that	 field.	As	 Ioannides	 (2005:	126)	noted:	 ‘…	 the	high rate	of	non‐replication	 (lack	of	 confirmation)	of	 research	
discoveries	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 convenient,	 yet	 ill‐founded	 strategy	 of	 claiming	 conclusive	 research	 findings	
solely	on	the	basis	of	a	single	study	assessed	by	formal	statistical	significance,	typically	for	a	p‐value	less	than	0.05’.	
8		This	 proposition	 is	 clearly	 less	 applicable	 to	 some	 fields	 of	 science	 than	 others:	 fundamental	 physics	 remains	 a	
cauldron	of	 ‘anomalous’	data	and	theoretical	pluralism	as	Smollin’s	(2013)	recent	attempt	to	 ‘de‐relativize’	 ‘time’	
suggests.		
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